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We present a new approach to digital forensic evidence acquisition and disk imaging called
sifting collectors that images only those regions of a disk with expected forensic value.
Sifting collectors produce a sector-by-sector, bit-identical AFF v3 image of selected disk
regions that can be mounted and is fully compatible with existing forensic tools and
methods. In our test cases, they have achieved an acceleration of >3 while collecting
>95% of the evidence, and in some cases we have observed acceleration of up to 13.
Sifting collectors challenge many conventional notions about forensic acquisition and may
help tame the volume challenge by enabling examiners to rapidly acquire and easily store
large disks without sacriﬁcing the many beneﬁts of imaging.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
4.0/).The need for a new approach to forensic acquisition
The continuously increasing size and number of disk
media has made digital forensics slow, cumbersome and
expensive. This problemeknown as the “volume challen-
ge”ehas long been identiﬁed as perhaps the greatest threat
to digital forensics. Evidence has become slow and costly
to acquire, store and analyze, with disks routinely taking
over 10 h to image, and delays and backlogs commonplace
(Richard and Roussev, 2006b; Roussev and Richard, 2004;
Garﬁnkel, 2010; NIJ, 2014).
One innovative approach to solving this problem that
has attracted considerable attention is to dispense with
the full imaging process, and merge evidence acquisition
with analysis, either via live forensics (Adelstein, 2006;
Carrier, 2006) or triage tools (Shaw and Browne, 2013;
Roussev et al., 2013; Overill et al., 2013; Marturana and
Tacconi, 2013; Bogen et al., 2013). Both live forensics and
triage tools involve dynamic processes for previewing theJ. Grier), golden@cs.
ier Ltd on behalf of DFRWSsystem state and available evidence, but these approaches
may forgo acquisition and preservation and instead record
the results of the analysis and not its sources. When on-
the-spot analysis replaces acquisition, there are no longer
any means to dig deeper, to look for missing clues or to
pursue a contrary line of investigation beyond what was
accomplished during triage. Because of these problems,
imaging, despite its expense, remains the gold standard for
many investigations.
Is it possible to tame the volume challenge without
sacriﬁcing the beneﬁts of imaging? We present a new
approach to imaging, called sifting collectors, in which
disk regions with forensic value are fully duplicated to
yield a sector-by-sector, bit-for-bit exact image (Section
Imaging selected regions of disks), whereas disk regions
that are deemed irrelevant are bypassed entirely (Section
Rapidly identifying relevant regions) using either sifting
proﬁles or investigation-driven methods (Section
Alternatives to Proﬁles). Sifting collectors produce an
Advanced Forensics Format (AFF) v3 image that can be
mounted and that is fully compatible with existing forensic
tools and methods (Section Storing partial images in AFF
v3).. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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while collecting >95% of evidence and 13while collecting
>50% of evidence in controlled, quantitative laboratory
trials and in real-world investigations (Section Results).Sifting collectors as a new approach
In general, only a small portion of the data on a disk has
any relevance or impact on forensic analysis. The vast
majority of sectors and ﬁles contain data irrelevant to
most investigations; in fact, many sectors are either blank
or contain data that is found verbatim on numerous other
systems (e.g., operating system and application compo-
nents). Fig. 1 depicts various categories of data present on
a typical disk. For some investigations, executable ﬁles may
be of interest. For others, browser artifacts are of primary
interest. Blank space is virtually never of use. The rest of
the data, beyond what is deemed relevant to a case, and
which constitutes the vast majority of the collection, could
actually be replaced by random noise without affecting
the forensic analysis.
Is it possible, from the outset, to identify and collect
only the relevant regions of the disk? Doing so would
maintain imaging's values of preservation, veriﬁability, de-
vice duplication, device semantics, and potential for further
analysis, at a much lower cost in time. It would accelerate
the collection process several times over, lower storage
requirements, and accelerate analysis. Realizing this goal
in an automated imaging tool, called a sifting collector, is
our central result. This tool has two requirements:
1. It must rapidly and automatically identify the forensi-
cally relevant regions of a disk, based on an investigator's
speciﬁcations or actions. More formally, it must identify
the regions of the disk containing evidence, or a
superset of these regions, in considerably less time than
that required by conventional imaging.
2. It must image only these selected regions in a manner
that is fully functional and veriﬁable, that preserves
low-level device semantics and that is suitable for fullFig. 1. Schematic illustration of typical disk. Different regions of the disk
vary greatly in their forensic value.forensic analysis. Additionally, the resultant image must
be compatible with existing forensic tools and methods.
A critical goal of our research is to duplicate the evidence
(i.e., the physical media) and not merely record our con-
clusions about it. We argue that the output of triage tools,
even when it includes ﬁle copies, should not be considered
as a duplicate of the evidence, because ﬁles and their con-
tents are not inherent properties of a disk, but rather in-
terpretations of the disk based on ﬁlesystem software and
conventions. Indeed, edge cases exist where different
operating systems or tools will disagree about what the
contents of a ﬁle actually are, slack space may be lost, etc.
Triage tools may make these types of decisions at run time
and store only their conclusions and not their sources,
lacking transparency and veriﬁability. Note also that courts
have, in some cases, deemed ﬁle by ﬁle acquisition unac-
ceptable when drive imaging is possible (Gates Rubber,
1996).
In contrast to our goal of transparent, veriﬁable dupli-
cation, we do not maintain that collecting all the available
data on a storage device is a requirement. Regardless of
whether or not it is desirable to collect all available data,
increasing storage capacities are rapidly making traditional
imaging infeasible and if trends in storage capacity
continue, it will ultimately be impossible, within reasonable
resource constraints, to copy all the data. Thus, we assert
that giving investigators explicit control of how much to
collect is both a necessity and a virtue; such control
allows investigators to analyze more devices relevant to
a given case and investigate more cases with available
resources. Investigating how other forensic disciplines
determine which evidence is worthy of examination
would be a worthwhile topic of further study; to the best
of our knowledge, no other discipline routinely examines
“all” possible sources without discretion. Note that we
recognize different cases call for different approaches,
and therefore do not argue that our goal of device level
duplication of only relevant evidence is universally supe-
rior; we do argue, however, that it is a valuable and sorely
needed capability.
In Section Imaging selected regions of disks, we discuss
Requirement 2 (imaging only selected regions), and in
Sections Rapidly identifying relevant regions and
Alternatives to Proﬁles, we discuss Requirement 1
(rapidly identifying relevant regions).Imaging selected regions of disks
Beginning with the ﬁrst sector, we divide a disk into
contiguous regions of a ﬁxed number of sectors called
grains; each grain is either imaged and duplicated in its
entirety or completely bypassed. We image a grain if either
of the following is true:
1. The grain contains any data associated with a forensically
relevant ﬁle or the grain contains at least one forensically
relevant disk sector (determining forensic relevance is
discussed in Sections Rapidly identifying relevant
regions and Alternatives to Proﬁles).
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(such as partition tables, ﬁle tables, journals or directory
structures). We collect such metadata universally
because it is required to locate and read the ﬁlesystem's
data and because it is typically of high forensic value.
Furthermore, its relatively small size makes collection
inexpensive.
The resulting collection is thus a full, bit-for-bit dupli-
cation of selected regions of the disk, preserving low-level
device semantics and critical qualities of imaging. Unlike
most triage tools, we preserve only raw, device-level data
that are directly veriﬁable against the original media; we
do not record or preserve any forensic analysis or even
ﬁlesystem-level abstractions such as ﬁle contents. Thus, we
maintain the valuable properties of imaging, while avoid-
ing the time-consuming duplication of blank or irrelevant
regions of the disk.
Using sifting proﬁles (described in Section Rapidly
identifying relevant regions), which describe ﬁles of inter-
est, we are able to rapidly identify the regions meeting
these criteria by leveraging a universal property of ﬁl-
esystems: By necessity, all ﬁlesystems must contain data
structures that readily identify their ﬁles, their properties
and their associated sectors; these structures are required
for rapid ﬁle access during normal operations.We use these
very structures to locate metadata and to rapidly
enumerate all ﬁles on a disk, to examine their properties
and determine their forensic interest and, whenwarranted,
to identify the sectors associated with them. Our prototype
implementation targets NTFS and uses the Master File
Table (MFT) as its primary source; the approach, however,
should work equally for other ﬁlesystems. In many cases,
even when ﬁles have been deleted, their associated meta-
data structures remain, which allows our implementation
to function normally (Carrier, 2005). When the metadata
has been overwritten, ﬁles can sometimes still be recovered
using ﬁle carving (Richard and Roussev, 2005); although our
prototype was not intended to support ﬁle carving, carving
nonetheless succeeded in over 75% of the cases we tested
(see Section Results). For cases where proﬁles are not
appropriate, Section Alternatives to Proﬁles describes
another investigation-directed method for rapidly identi-
fying sectors of interest.
Because the resulting image is a device-level duplicate
and includes all volume and ﬁlesystem metadata, it can be
mounted using standard tools and examined using stan-
dard forensic procedures. We discuss below how we indi-
cate the absence of the bypassed regions in the image and
how we handle read requests to those regions (Section
Storing partial images in AFF v3), and describe how we use
the collected image with FTK, the Sleuthkit, log2timeline
and other standard forensic tools (Section Results).
Our approach is not suitable for physically damaged
media, ordamaged, tamperedwith or unknownﬁlesystems.
In the future, we intend to incorporate a media integrity
check into the collector, which reverts to conventional im-
aging in these cases. Likewise, our approach is not suitable
for steganographic ﬁlesystems, such as Rubberhose
(Rubberhose, 2015) or StegFS (StegFS, 2015), or other caseswhere ﬁles have been hidden beyond the reach of standard
operating systems; to our knowledge, such systems, how-
ever, have not been widely adopted in the wild.Quantifying a region's forensic relevance
Before exploring how to rapidly identify relevant sec-
tors, we ﬁrst introduce an objective, observable measure of
relevance. Consider the following:
Deﬁnition 1. A region is forensically relevant if and only if
the conclusions of an associated investigation are sub-
stantially altered if the region's contents are replaced with
random values.
Relevance is therefore not a property of a region alone,
but a region in the context of a forensic investigation. Spe-
ciﬁcally, it depends on the purposes of investigation (Pogue,
2011). Despite its dependence on context, relevance can
indeed be quantiﬁed, using the following abstract
procedure:
1. Perform a forensic investigation in a fully
reproducible manner. That is, the procedure must be an
effective procedure, using Turing's classic deﬁnition
(Turing, 1936), i.e., a fully deﬁned or automated proce-
dure which results in a quantiﬁable, deﬁnite conclusion.
2. Randomize the value of a particular region.
3. Repeat the investigation. The region is relevant, in the
context of this investigation, if and only if, the conclu-
sions of the investigation differ.
We now have an objective, observable deﬁnition of
relevance, as a function of both the data in the region and
the investigative procedure employed.
Deﬁnition 2. A region which is never read in the course
of a forensic analysis procedure is called manifestly
irrelevant.
Note that some analysis procedures, such as a full
disk search for keywords, leave no region manifestly
irrelevant.
The concept of relevance can be extended to a region
which has not yet been read, but is known to have certain
properties. We call this concept expected relevance, and
quantify it as a probability measure (between 0 and 1),
deﬁned as the a priori probability that a region known to
have certain properties is relevant to a particular investi-
gation. Intuitively, this can be understood as the probability
that a region with such properties on a randomly selected
disk will be relevant (using the frequentist probability
interpretation), or our degree of belief that a particular
region known only to have such properties is relevant
(using the Bayesian probability interpretation) (Hajek,
2003). Expected relevance is likewise a function of both
the known properties of that region and the investigative
procedure employed.
Given sufﬁcient cases, disks, and reproducible forensic
procedures, it is possible to measure expected relevance
over numerous types of regions. In general, we conjecture
that:
Fig. 2. A disk can be abstractly viewed as a graph, with sectors as vertices
and data references as edges. Forensically relevant sectors and references
(shown in bold) form a spanning tree. By walking this spanning tree, we can
image all necessary data without reading the entire disk.
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have very low expected relevance (close to 0).
Proposition 3b. Regions containing volume or
ﬁlesystem metadata have very high expected relevance
(close to 1).
Proposition 3c. Regions known to contain data belonging
to known artifacts (e.g., a browser cache), or to known lo-
cations of artifacts (e.g., a log directory) have high expected
relevance.
Proposition 3d. The expected relevance of a region is
highly correlated with the ﬁle types and ﬁle names whose
data is contained in the region.
Proposition 3e. In general, the expected relevance of a
region is highly correlated with properties that can be
ascertained from ﬁlesystem metadata, such as ﬁle names,
types, and locations of data stored within the region; MAC
times associated with the region; and allocation status and
history of the region.
Our approach is based on these propositions and the
results of our initial case studies (described in Section
Results), support them. In future work, they will be
measured over a larger sample space. We note that ﬁl-
esystem metadata makes it easy to identify currently allo-
cated sectors, but does not always allow differentiating
previously allocated sectors from never allocated sectors.
However, given that sector allocation is often sequential, it
is possible to infer from the metadata the highest sector
that was ever allocated (since the ﬁlesystem structures
were created), within a reasonable margin of error. This
inference can also be tested in real-time with sampling.
This allows for a simple, low risk approach to eliminating
never allocated sectors from consideration.
Rapidly identifying relevant regions
As we've argued previously, only a small part of a typical
collection is ultimately relevant. How do we automatically
identify these regions of the disk at the time of imaging?
For that matter, how do forensic examiners ultimately
identify such regions manually? Can we incorporate the
procedures that such forensic examiners use into the im-
aging process itself?
A common process underlies most forensic examina-
tions: forensic examiners or automated tools ﬁnd relevant
data; the examiners (or tools) parse and analyze these
relevant data; and the examiners (or tools) learn the loca-
tion of additional forensic data from these data, and the
process then repeats recursively. For example, in Lee's ex-
amination of a compromised IIS Web server (Lee, 2012),
he ﬁrst uses the Sleuthkit to parse the partition table and
ﬁnd the ﬁlesystem's initial sector. With that information,
he locates and parses the MFT in the NTFS partition and
uses the MFT to locate the system logs, which he further
analyzes using the log2timeline tool (Log2timeline, 2015).
Formalizing this process, we can view a disk as a graph,
with sectors as vertices and data references as edges. The
essential concept is that we can ﬁnd all necessary data
by walking a spanning tree (see Fig. 2). Binary reverse-engineering tools such as IDA Pro use a similar algorithm
to identify executable code (Bachaalany, 2011; Pyew, 2015);
to the best of our knowledge, no one has yet explicitly
noted the algorithm's relevance to disk forensics. Our goal
is to capture this process in an automated method.
To automate this scheme as part of the imaging
process itself, we introduce the concept of a focusing pro-
cedure. A focusing procedure is any means by which an
examiner identiﬁes certain data as relevant and chooses
to ignore other data as irrelevant. To incorporate a focusing
procedure into an imaging tool, the procedure must have
two properties:
1. It must not require spontaneous ingenuity or judgment
but must be deﬁnable in advance.
2. It must not require exhaustive reads of the entire disk
but must use some form of pointers, index, metadata, or
other mechanism to directly identify the location of the
applicable data.
We call a focusing procedure with both these properties
compressible; see Table 1 for some common examples. Cle-
arly, many focusing procedures, such as examining known
artifacts or ﬁles with timestamps matching a window, are
fully compressible. However, other focusing procedures are
not fully compressible: for example, keyword-based disk
searches lack the second property because such searches
typically require reading the entire disk.
Compressible focusing procedures can readily be
incorporated into the imaging process itself, collecting only
those sectors identiﬁed as relevant. Using this exclusively
would entail forgoing all non-compressible focusing pro-
cedures, resulting in functionality that resembles a triage
tool in that it delivers the most readily obtainable evidence,
Table 1
Common focusing procedures. Procedures with YES values for both properties are compressible and can be performed at acquisition time as part of the
imaging process itself.
Focusing procedure Example Can it be deﬁned
in advance?
Can it be performed
with minimal disk reads?
Known artifact Examine known artifacts, such as Firefox's history,
stored in known folders
Y Y
MAC timestamps Examine only ﬁles created within a certain
timeframe
Y Y
Anomalous ﬁle name or location Examine ﬁles in the WINDOWS directory that are
anomalous or misspelled
Y Y
Autoruns Examine ﬁles that run automatically on boot Y Y
Hash-based ﬁle search Examine ﬁles with hashes corresponding to known
malware or contraband
Y N
Keyword-based sector search Search disk for keywords of interest N N
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device duplication and veriﬁability). To collect evidence
more comprehensively than attainable this way, we also
use an additional approach, called supersetting approxima-
tions, described below.
Supersetting approximations can best be illustrated
with a concrete example. Keyword-based sector searches
are not compressible because any sector may possibly
contain a keyword. Nonetheless, the probability distribu-
tion of containing a keyword is by no means uniform over
all sectors. Sectors that are associated with text and docu-
ment ﬁles, for example, have a high probability of con-
taining a keyword; sectors associated with executables, for
example, or sectors that have never been allocated, have a
much lower probability of containing a keyword. Although
a keyword search is not compressible, we can readily es-
timate the probability of a sector matching and collect
an approximating superset of sectors with a sufﬁciently
high probability of matching. For example, an exhaustive
keyword search of an entire disk might yield 100 sectors,
whereas a probabilistically deﬁned approximating superset
of such disk might contain 100,000 sectors, including
98 of the true 100 sectors that can be found via the full
keyword search.
As explained above in Section Quantifying a region's
forensic relevance, relevance is deﬁned in the context of aFig. 3. Some representative proﬁles. The NPSjean proﬁle was used to solve the pop
registry ﬁles and spreadsheets. The Misconduct proﬁle targets browsing history, O
deﬁne relevant pathnames and ﬁlenames.particular mode of investigation. Consequently, proﬁles
must be selected (or authored) to match the needs of the
particular case. Initially, we intended to develop a complex,
procedural language to deﬁne supersetting approxima-
tions. However, we discovered that such complexity was
not warranted, since expected relevance is sufﬁciently
correlated with simple, readily determined properties,
often expressible as simple regular expressions. Although it
may be possible to use procedural deﬁnitions to tighten
these supersets, we prefer the simplicity gained by using
simple expressions.
Our implementation, written in Cþþ, allows an exam-
iner to select a pre-existing (or write a fresh) sifting proﬁle
that deﬁnes ﬁle relevance based on these readily deter-
mined properties, such as ﬁle name, location and time-
stamps. MIME type, such as text document or audio, is a key
driver of expected relevance; we use ﬁle name, extension,
and location as proxies. For many investigations, only ﬁles
created and edited by users, or edited during certain time
periods, are relevant (Pal and Memon, 2009). We deter-
mine these by observing MAC timestamps, as described
in (Farmer and Venema, 2005; Agrawal et al., 2007). Our
prototype targets NTFS and can typically determine the
sectors associated with matching ﬁles by simply scanning
the MFT. We have currently implemented a small library of
proﬁles that are targeted to collect different types ofular open source case and targets various email and chat artifacts as well as
utlook email, and various graphics ﬁle formats. The components of a proﬁle
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actively working to expand this library. Representative
proﬁles are depicted in Fig. 3, to illustrate their basic
structure, which currently consists of descriptions of rele-
vant pathnames and ﬁlenames, based on regular expres-
sions, and boolean expressions concerning MAC
timestamps. Inwriting the proﬁles, wewere guided by both
existing forensic practice and size distributions of common
ﬁle types. In particular, the irregular bimodal distribution of
ﬁle sizes (Agrawal et al., 2007) indicates that rejecting even
a small number of ﬁle types can result in large savings of
space; thus, we are liberal in collecting ﬁles that are typi-
cally small, and frugal in collecting ﬁles that are often large.
Our testing shows that by using supersetting approxi-
mations, we are able to recover between 54% and 100%
of relevant evidence for a case in a fraction of the time
(Section Results). Supersetting approximations work for
two reasons: First, because exhaustive searching is
impractical for daily operations, systems typically include
rapidly accessible metadata to locate data of interest; as
long as we can ﬁnd and parse that metadata, we can
identify which sectors are likely to have the data of interest
without having to read the sectors themselves. Second, due
to the locality principle (Denning, 2005), forensically rele-
vant sectors are frequently adjacent to other forensically
relevant sectors; thus, if we can ﬁnd metadata that in-
dicates the expected relevance of even one sector in the
region, we can collect the entire region. Therefore, we can
tolerate the absence of some metadata without losing ev-
idence. Due to the locality principle, our implementation,
though not intended to support ﬁle carving, allowed carv-
ing operations to succeed over 75% of the time (see Section
Results).
One important weakness of sifting collectors is their
increased vulnerability to steganography and anti-
forensics (Foster and Liu, 2005). Anti-forensics (for
example, disguising a suspicious ﬁle to appear innocuous),
though effective even against conventional imaging, is
especially potent when applied against sifting collectors.
When used against conventional imaging, anti-forensics
can cause an analysis failure, whereas with sifting col-
lectors, it causes the evidence to be completely omitted
from collection. If an analyst using conventional imaging
suspects anti-forensics might have been deployed, they
can develop and apply countermeasures at any point inFig. 4. Our “human in the loop” imager (HILPI), which uses a copy-on-read (COR) s
forensic investigation to an AFFv3 sifted image. HILPI can either supplement or repthe process (Garﬁnkel, 2007), whereas using sifting col-
lectors, these countermeasures must be applied at, and
incorporated into, the collection process itself. Moreover,
when supersetting approximations are used, anti-
forensics is made fundamentally easier, since only the
metadata, and not the data itself, needs to be disguised.
For example, under conventional imaging, a ﬁle disguised
to appear innocuous may in some cases still be found
through exhaustive hashing, which is incompatible with
supersetting approximations. Finally, if sifting collectors
were to become widely used, it's possible that steganog-
raphy and anti-forensics speciﬁcally designed to hide from
sifting collectors would be developed. Although we intend
in future work to incorporate anti-forensics countermea-
sures into sifting collectors, for these reasons we feel that
sifting collectors' exposure to anti-forensics will remain
higher than conventional imaging, yet lower than triage
tools.
Alternatives to proﬁles
In many cases, proﬁles (discussed in the previous sec-
tion) provide a convenient mechanism for identifying
relevant regions of a storage device. In cases where triage is
preferred (or required), we offer a different method, which
essentially endows triage efforts with reproducibility. This
involves introduction of a “human-in-the-loop” partial
imager (HILPI). HILPI is inserted into the access path of the
storage device to be examined and a virtual disk is exposed
to the examiner which shadows the target storage device,
as illustrated in Fig. 4. Using a copy-on-read (COR) strategy,
all sectors that are read from the virtual disk during the
examination are automatically copied into an AFFv3 format
sifted image. An investigator using HILPI is free to explore
the disk in any way they choose. However, unlike typical
live forensics scenarios, a complete chain of evidence of
the state of the disk, at the device level, is preserved and
imaged, in a format which allows reexamination and full
reproducibility. For example, imagine an examiner uses a
tool to locate all ﬁles on a disk modiﬁed during a certain
time window. The tool reads and queries the ﬁlesystem
metadata stored on the disk and as these reads occur,
HILPI automatically creates a partial image of these sectors,
allowing subsequent veriﬁcation of this analysis. The
examiner then selects one ﬁle from the list, examines it,trategy to duplicate only regions of a disk that are actually accessed during a
lace the use of traditional proﬁles in our partial imaging scheme.
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disk used to read the ﬁle (including both the ﬁles data
sectors and relevant metadata sectors) are automatically
imaged by HILPI, allowing an opposing examiner to verify
or dispute this judgment. Finally, the examiner opens a
second ﬁle and draws conclusions from it. Without
manual action, HILPI ensures that all sectors required to
reconstruct this ﬁle are preserved. Any sector that is
examined, explicitly or implicitly, or in any way inﬂuences
the examiner's live investigation, is preserved in the image.
And, while the sectors that the examiner never reads are
likewise omitted, whatever process the examiner uses to
determine that these sectors are not relevant is fully
reproducible, allowing full defense or challenge to the
process, without the need to rely on the examiners' faith,
credibility, or memory. In this manner, HILPI brings the
veriﬁability and reproducibility long enjoyed by forensic
imaging to live forensics, while preserving live forensics'
speed and power. After the examination is completed, the
AFFv3 format sifted image is available to permit the same
tools (and any other tools which access the same data that
was collected) to be used again to demonstrate the results
obtained during triage (see Fig. 5).
Storing partial images in AFF v3
We store the resulting image in the Advanced Forensics
Format (AFF) v3 format (Garﬁnkel et al., 2006). v3 is the
most commonly used version of AFF, and was not designed
or intended for partial images. Nonetheless, we are able to
use it for such without modiﬁcation, as explained below.
By repurposing an existing, widely supported format, we
gain compatibility with a wide array of existing forensic
tools and procedures, avoiding the barriers to adoption that
come with introduction of a new format.
AFF consists entirely of uniquely named segments that
store either the raw device data or metadata about the
image. Segments are retrieved by name via a master dic-
tionary and can thus be stored in any order. Device data are
grouped into contiguous regions called pages, and each
page is stored in a single, uniquely named segment (e.g.,
segment page30 may store bytes
251658240e260046847). Within a segment, data are
stored and retrieved by position, providing good
performance.
Although not designed for partial images, AFF's elegant
design can fortuitously be used to support such images: as
long as the sifting collector's grain size equals the AFFFig. 5. Quantitative test results for theformat's page size (or an even multiple of it), all AFF pages
will be either imaged in their entirety or completely absent.
Therefore, we can simply omit uncollected pages from the
image ﬁle.
The AFF implementation used in tested versions of
AccessData's FTK functioned as-is with our enhanced AFF
partial images. The AFFLIB v3 implementation required
only a simple patch. For forensic tools that do not support
AFF, we use existing loopback adapter interfaces (affuse
on Linux and FTK's built-in adapter on Windows), and
these tools allowed all our tested forensics tools to operate
ﬂawlessly.
We thus propose a single, fully backwards compatible
addition to the AFFv3 speciﬁcation:
A data pageMAY be absent from an AFFv3 ﬁle. This absence
occurs when the page was not collected (i.e., a partial image).
Implementations MUST therefore appropriately handle read
requests for data located on a missing page. Implementations
SHOULD be conﬁgurable to handle this situation through any
of the following responses:
1. Returning an error indicating the data are missing
2. Returning well known dummy data
3. Returning binary NULLs
4. Indicating a bad sector.
Finally, as an alternative to AFF, we support writing RAW
ﬁles using sparse null data for bypassed regions. As dis-
cussed in Section Related work, however, sparse ﬁles can
lose storage savings when copied, and therefore we don't
encourage using this format.Results
To test the accuracy, time savings and compatibility of
our approach with existing forensics tools and methods
and to measure the quantity and quality of evidence
collected, we performed a battery of controlled tests on
both sifted collections (collected by our Cþþ prototype
implementation) and on standard images as a control.
The tests included both laboratory testing and recreating
two full digital investigations. We performed our tests
using common, unmodiﬁed forensic tools and compared
the investigative results with the results from ground
truth and detailed investigations performed on full disk
images, as appropriate. We discuss our results in this
section.CFReDS and DOMEXUSERS cases.
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ber of disk sectors read during conventional imaging
divided by the total number of disk sectors read during
sifting collection. Disk reads are the bottleneck in high-
speed imaging and our implementation is designed to
exploit disk characteristics and minimize search time by
performing reads in disk order in 8 MB contiguous batches;
thus, we believe that this calculation is appropriate. For
future research, we intend to build a multithreaded col-
lector with optimized code and compression routines and
benchmark the acceleration in clock time.
Accuracy testing
In evaluating the accuracy of a sifting collector, the
critical issues arewhether the partial image acquired by the
sifting collector is accurate and precisely mirrors data on
the original disk, whether the partial image contains all
data targeted by the selected proﬁle, and whether the AFF
format of the partial image is robust and complete. For
our accuracy tests, we ran standard forensic tools against
both sifted and unsifted versions of a number of publicly
available images and performed tests at the volume, ﬁl-
esystem, ﬁle and sector levels. At the volume and ﬁlesystem
levels, we queriedmetadata usingmmls and fsstat from the
Sleuthkit and veriﬁed that the results matched exactly. The
only discrepancies noted at the volume level resulted from
the sifting collector padding volume lengths with null bytes
to a multiple of 8 MB, which has since been corrected. At
the individual ﬁle level, we tested many ﬁles and di-
rectories using istat and icat. All the tests were successful
except for tests involving NTFS compressed ﬁles, which are
not currently supported. At the sector level, a large number
of random sectors were selected and evaluated on a bit-by-
bit basis using dd and affcat. All tests at the sector level
indicated that each sector was collected accurately.
Quantitative testing
We further measured the accuracy, acceleration, and
comprehensiveness by using existing forensic tools on two
publicly available source disks, NIST CFReDS (CFReDS, 2015)
and NPS nps-2009-domexusers (NPS-DOMEXUSERS, 2015),
comparing the results of bulk_ extractor (Bulk_extractor,
2015), log2timeline (Log2timeline, 2015), pasco (Pasco,
2015), regripper (Regripper, 2015), and the complete set
of the Sleuthkit (TSK, 2015) command line tools. Because
they collect large numbers of data (e.g., ﬁnding every email
address on the disk), these tools can objectively quantify
the portion of evidence collected; thus, we determined that
bulk_extractor was able to ﬁnd 26,390 emails on the con-
ventional image and 25,111 emails on the sifted image. On
the CFReDS disk, we achieved an acceleration between
3.7x-5.0 and collected between 95 and 100% of the evi-
dence with 100% accuracy. On the DOMEX USERS disk, we
achieved an acceleration between 11x-13, collecting be-
tween 54% and 100% of the evidence at 100% accuracy (see
Fig. 5). Preliminary investigation indicates that the missing
data (in the case of 54% collection) were located in the
System Restore Points, which the collector was not
conﬁgured to acquire.Qualitative testing
Because a key requirement is compatibility with exist-
ing forensic tools, we used popular GUI tools with the im-
ages, such as FTK v3.2, FTK Imager Lite and osTriage (using
FTK's adapter). Because sifted images use the standard AFF
format, the images were processed exactly as expected by
all three tools; disk regions not present in the sifted image
were represented by zero-ﬁlled content, and all the ﬁles
targeted by the selected proﬁle were correctly processed.
Investigation # 1: A synthetic case: M57-Jean
The M57-Jean case (M57-Jean, 2015) involves a startup
company where an Excel spreadsheet with conﬁdential
information, originating from their CFO's computer, was
discovered posted in the technical support forum of a
competitor. The investigation must determine when the
spreadsheet was created, how it got to the competitor's
website and who (besides the CFO) might be involved in
the data exﬁltration. The evidence consists of a copy of
the spreadsheet and a single 10 GB NTFS disk. Because the
investigation targets Excel spreadsheets, employee com-
munications, and other potential avenues for data exﬁl-
tration, a sifting collector proﬁle (named NPSJEAN) was
developed that targets Outlook, Thunderbird, and Win-
dows Live email; common chat clients, such as AIM; and
Windows registry ﬁles, which are important in analyzing
USB devices previously connected to a computer running
Windows. A sifting collector was used with this proﬁle
and imaged the disk with an acceleration factor of 3.2.
An investigation was then initiated using the Sleuthkit
(modiﬁed only by linking with our updated version of
AFFLIB), readpst (Libpst, 2015), regripper, and other tools.
The contested spreadsheet and a number of relevant emails
and chat logs were discovered. USB activity was inconclu-
sive, although the previous attachment of two USB devices
was noted. Examination of the emails and chat logs in-
dicates a strong likelihood of a phishing attack against the
CFO that resulted in data exﬁltration; however, chat mes-
sages reveal the possibility that the CFO's account had been
compromised. We wrote up our investigative conclusions
in a ﬁnal report, which we then compared against the
publicly available solution: our conclusions and discoveries
matched exactly. Sifting collectors thus yielded an accel-
eration factor of 3.2, and 100% collection accuracy and
comprehensiveness.
Investigation # 2: A real case: employee misconduct
We also investigated a real case from our previous pri-
vate casework, involving employee violations of corporate
policies against workplace viewing content that is not
suitable for work (NSFW). Outlook email (including at-
tachments), photographic images, relevant Windows reg-
istry artifacts and the use of Internet Explorer were
targeted by the proﬁle. The original investigation involved
three disks (40 GB,160 GB and 320 GB in size), and involved
recovering and investigating both intact and deleted pic-
tures, emails, documents, browser histories, and other ar-
tifacts, to discover evidence of NSFW material. It used FTK
Table 2
Different segments of forensics community. Sifting collectors deliver the
most value for users with both time pressure and the need for preserva-
tion and veriﬁability.
User segment Time pressure Need for preservation,
veriﬁability, and admissibility
Law enforcement High High
Civil litigation Low Very high
Incident response Very high Low
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ages, ﬁle carving to recover deleted ﬁles, a review of
approximately 185,000 pictures, and review and book-
marking of discovered Outlook email.
To perform this investigation using sifting collectors,
we developed a proﬁle named MISCONDUCT, targeting
photographic images, theWindows registry, web-browsing
artifacts and Outlook email, and used it to collect each disk.
Sifted disk images were successfully collected for the
160 GB and 320 GB drives, but failed for the 40 GB disk,
which appears to have been caused by disk corruption
(another forensic tool was also unable to process the disk,
although FTK v3.2 processed it correctly in the original
investigation). Fortunately, the original investigation (using
conventional imaging) found no usable evidence on the
40 GB disk, and the disk was omitted from further
consideration. Sifting collectors achieved a 2.9 accelera-
tion factor on the 160 GB disk, and a 9.6 acceleration
factor on the 320 GB disk.
We repeated the original investigation process on the
sifted images, using the same forensic tools and environ-
ment as the original investigation, and compared their re-
sults. We recovered and analyzed photographs, browser
history, Powerpoint presentations, Outlook emails, and
registry artifacts, and performed limited ﬁle carving.
The sifting collector investigation yielded 100% of the
relevant evidence for the 320 GB disk, which contained
177,775 ﬁles in total. 100% collection comprehensiveness
is attributed to the fact that ﬁle carving in the original
case yielded no NSFW ﬁles for the 320 GB disk. For the
160 GB sifted AFF disk image, 62 JPEG ﬁles (out of 10,193
JPEGs that did not require carving) and 32 PNG ﬁles (out of
6495 that did not require carving) that were expected to be
collected by the sifting collector were not included in the
image. Analysis revealed that these missing ﬁles were in
a particular branch of the Internet Explorer history direc-
tory; we are currently investigating the cause of this
omission. Moreover, although our implementation was not
designed to support ﬁle carving, we were nonetheless able
to recover 17 out of the 22 NSFW carved photographs that
were identiﬁed in the original investigation; we attribute
this to these ﬁles being located in adjacent regions to ﬁles
with intact metadata, as described in Section Rapidly
identifying relevant regions. Thus, for the 160 GB disk,
only 95 ﬁles that did not require carving and 5 ﬁles that did
require carving, out of a total of 322,364, weremissing from
the sifted image, yielding >99% collection
comprehensiveness.
In summary, the sifting collector yielded an acceleration
factor of 2.9 and a collection comprehensiveness of over
99% on the 160 GB disk, and an acceleration factor of 9.6
and a collection comprehensiveness of 100% on the
320 GB disk.
How useful are sifting collectors to forensic
examiners?
We informally interviewed forensic examiners to learn
the practical value that sifting collectors may provide. Ex-
aminers reported highly divergent attitudes about both
their need for imaging and the problems caused by its longduration. Wewere initially perplexed by this variance, until
we grouped examiners into three segments (law enforce-
ment, civil litigation and incident response), each of which
displayed internal consistency (see Table 2). Sifting collec-
tors deliver the most value for examiners with a high need
for imaging and high sensitivity to its duration (as observed
in law enforcement).
As implemented, sifting collectors require a proﬁle
deﬁning the types of evidence to collect. We do not expect
examiners to be able to write such proﬁles anew for each
case but instead to select from a library. This approach
relies on what we call the investigation class hypothesis:
investigations fall into a limited number of classes, each
with similar evidentiary requirements. Testing this hy-
pothesis is a key goal of future research.Related work
For over a decade, researchers have raised concerns over
the inadequacy of forensic processes to address increasing
disk volume and the need for alternatives to full acquisition
procedures (Richard and Roussev, 2006b, a). (Botchek,
2008) provides an excellent discussion of the perfor-
mance limits of disk imaging. Some have argued that, in
addition to practical concerns, conventional imaging is
exposed to signiﬁcant legal risks due to the inability to turn
around cases in a timely manner (Kenneally and Brown,
2005). Turner's digital evidence bags, which mimic con-
tainers used in other forensic disciplines (Turner, 2006),
offer one of the earliest examples of selective imaging.
AFFv4 introduces explicit support for composing images
out of multiple sources and regions, making it well suited
for partial imaging. However, AFFv4 has not seen adoption,
largely due to its complexity. Our work demonstrates that
existing, simple, widely supported formats, though not
designed for it, can fully support partial imaging. Stuttgen
clariﬁes the distinction between collecting at the ﬁle, ﬁl-
esystem, partition and device (i.e., sector or block) levels,
and presents software allowing an investigator to choose
particular sectors to image (Stuttgen et al., 2013). However,
this is a manual approach, in which the investigator
manually chooses each individual sector or ﬁle that is
desired. Moreover, because it may lack sectors with ﬁl-
esystem metadata, the resulting image is not necessarily
mountable or analyzable by standard forensic tools.
X-Ways Forensics (X-Ways, 2015), a commercial forensic
tool suite, also offers selective acquisition via a feature
called skeleton images. Regions and data to be copied must
be selected manually, similar to that of Stuttgens tools, so
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save time or accelerate the collection process. Unlike
sifting, which ﬁrst does a rapid analysis pass, determines
sectors of interest, and collects them in disk order, disk
sectors are collected as items are manually selected,
causing additional bottlenecks. Finally, skeleton images are
stored as NTFS sparse ﬁles, which means that when images
are copied to different media, all storage savings will be
completely lost. In contrast with manual approaches like
Stuttgen's and X-Ways, sifting collectors automate and
accelerate selective acquisition. Furthermore, by repurpos-
ing the standard AFF format to support partial images,
sifting collectors produce portable images that are readily
analyzable by existing tools, without modiﬁcation.
Triage has become a hotly debated topic in the digital
forensics community (Roussev et al., 2013; Overill et al.,
2013; Marturana and Tacconi, 2013; Bogen et al., 2013),
with the Journal of Digital Investigation devoting an entire
issue to it (Digital Investigation, 2013). While certainly
valuable, triage has several shortcomings as a replacement
for acquisition, such as missing important evidence and
potentially damaging relevant evidence, particularly in
view of how triage is currently practiced (Shaw and
Browne, 2013). In fact, some researchers argue that triage
is a focus of study simply because the only other alternative
appears to be complete imaging (Pollitt, 2013). We submit
that sifting collectors offer another option by preserving
the qualities of imaging (and the potential for deep forensic
analysis in the lab) while addressing the concerns of the
volume challenge and backlogs.
Future work
Testing sifting collectors in the real world is the next
step. This testing requires expanding the library of proﬁles,
improving the approach's robustness and conducting
controlled tests on real-world cases. We are currently
implementing a multithreaded, optimized collector and
when this is complete, will produce timed performance
benchmarks. In addition to proﬁles and HILPI, we are also
investigating other means of identifying relevant disk re-
gions, including random sampling (Garﬁnkel et al., 2010),
ﬁle-level analysis, and integration with memory forensics
(e.g., identifying ﬁles from memory). We are currently
maturing our lab prototype into a production ready, robust
engine, with a goal of direct integration into existing
forensic products. We aim to integrate sifting collectors
into the gamut of forensic technology, including disk du-
plicators and imagers (both hardware and software based),
analysis tools (allowing post-collection reduction of image
size), triage tools and live forensics (so that a sifted image,
allowing full reproduction of the triage, is generated as the
triage takes place) and enterprise forensics and incident
response (where scarce bandwidth makes sifting acceler-
ation particularly valuable). We invite community mem-
bers interested in participating in such to contact us.
Conclusions
The volume and backlog of digital evidence continues to
grow, and novel paradigms of acquisition are required. Weargue that sifting collectors present such an innovation.
Moreover, sifting collectors challenge several commonly
held notions: Previously, the question of what evidence to
acquire (entire devices versus selected data) was assumed
to be intertwined with the question of how to acquire it
(media duplication versus acquiring ﬁles or live analysis).
Sifting collectors disrupt such coupling. Likewise, they
provide new opportunities to innovate by demonstrating
that novel modes of acquisition can still support device-
level forensics and be fully compatible with existing
forensic tools.
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